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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

SCD-M69-771
15 DEC 1969

SUBJECT : Secure Voice Requirements for [REDACTED]

REFERENCES : (a) NSA letter, dated 7 Nov 69; Subject: Reduction of NSA Secure Telephone System

(b) Executive Director Memo ER-69-3878, dated 29 Jul 69; Subject: Reduction of NSA Secure Telephone System

(c) Your memo NPIC/D-122/69, dated 7 May 69; Subject: Secure Telephone Requirements for [REDACTED]

(d) My memo TS-M68-542, dated 30 Dec 68; Subject: Secure Telephone Requirements for [REDACTED]

1. Discussion between members of our respective staffs regarding the NSA decision to defer the date of reduction of NSA Secure Telephone System beyond FY-70 (Reference a) and the effect of this action on plans for providing for NPIC post FY-70 secure voice needs, resulted in your request that the Office of Communications recommend a method of compensating for changes involved.


2. The primary effect of the NSA action is that a large portion of the Washington area secure voice community will continue to be served via the NSA Secure Telephone System (NSA GRAY System) in the FY70-74 time frame, and coverage via the DOD AUTOSEVOCOM System will not be as extensive as foreseen in our original study (Reference d). Related to NPIC post FY-70 secure voice needs and the system presently approved for meeting those requirements, this means that more access to the NSA GRAY System, and less to the CIA and AUTOSEVOCOM Systems, must be provided [REDACTED] users to compensate for the change in community coverage. It is our understanding that no change in sizing of the in-house [REDACTED] user portion of the approved NPIC secure voice system is foreseen as a result of the change, and that calling patterns which were established during a recent survey continue valid. It then follows that the most logical systems approach is to adjust to the change in environment by

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utilizing split trunking to allow NPIC users full access to the NSA GRAY Systems users as well as the Agency System and the AUTOSEVOCOM community. We believe this is also the most economical approach, as no in-house plant configuration changes to the new system are involved; all changes would be on the outboard side of the new NPIC switch (trunk interface equipment and access points). Staffing requirements remain the same as set forth for the approved system. Estimated costs of this split trunking approach compared against those for the NPIC Secure Voice System as presently approved are:

First Year Cost :

Recurring Annual Cost :
(after first year)

5 Year Terminal Liability

Annual Staffing Costs (after
first year)



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Details of this concept are contained in the attachment.

3. The benefits derivable from utilizing the above approach are offset considerably by loss of control inherent in systems of a bilateral nature. In this instance, NSA approval must be obtained for direct trunking into the NSA GRAY System, for providing service in that system to a greater number of NPIC subscribers than originally planned, and physical security inspections would be accomplished under joint CIA/NSA auspices. The split trunking approach was discussed at some length at a meeting of NSA, NPIC and OC Representatives at Ft. Meade on 2 December. The purpose of this meeting was to explore policy, operational and security aspects involved, and to define problem areas, if any, before the proposal was developed further within CIA. The results were that the NSA Representatives could foresee no major problems that would prevent concurrence, but stated that NSA policy level approval in principle would have to be obtained through formal channels before details could be worked out.

4. An alternative approach is to utilize split trunking techniques to access the NSA GRAY System via the CIA GRAY switch at Langley. Capital investment in the system and staffing requirements would be the same as for the above, but recurring annual line costs would be approximately [] greater. The same bi-lateral arrangements as noted for the above would apply to this approach. This approach is less attractive than the other in terms of economy and transmission engineering.

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5. It is recommended that the NPIC Secure Voice System as now approved be amended as set forth in para 2, above, to adjust to the change in community coverage. If you approve, we will prepare for the Executive Director-Comptroller signature, a memorandum advising NSA of this proposal and requesting agreement in principle.

6. If additional details are required, please contact :

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Chief, Staff Communications Division
Office of Communications

Att: Concept Study Amended NPIC
Secure Voice System

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